[Building Surveying Case Study] Unraveling the Leaky Homes Conundrum: Navigating Responsibility Among Building Code Makers, Designers, Suppliers, Builders, and Quality Controllers

PropTech@ecyY
7 min readDec 4, 2023
Figure 1 New Zealand Leaky Homes Sage. https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/116236850/the-rottenomics-of-the-47-billion-leaky-homes-market-failure#:~:text=Dyer%20put%20the%20blame%20for,and%20techniques%20flood%20the%20market.

New Zealand’s predicament with leaky homes has been characterized as the nation’s most extensive and costly man-made crisis. Approximately 174,000 homes across the country grapple with watertightness issues, and the anticipated cost to rectify these problems looms at an estimated $50 billion (Bolton, 2022).

In retrospect, the genesis of the “leaky homes” crisis can be traced back to the 1990s, a period marked by the deregulation of the building industry. The confluence of design flaws, subpar products, inadequate cladding, poor workmanship, and shortcomings in inspection processes left numerous homeowners vulnerable to the perils of faulty buildings (Newsroom, 2021).

Within the discipline of building surveying, the saga of leaky homes in New Zealand emerges as a captivating case study, offering profound insights into the intricate web of responsibilities shared among designers, builders, suppliers, and building controllers. This series of articles embarks on an exploration of the central question: Who should bear the responsibility for the pervasive leakage issues that have plagued these homes? Against the backdrop of numerous court cases targeting suppliers, builders, and councils, many of which have concluded or been settled privately in recent years, this inquiry will be informed by an examination of court case reports.

This particular article seeks to scrutinize the roles and interactions of key stakeholders in the quality control of building construction. By doing so, it aims to unveil the nuanced dynamics at play within the leaky homes saga, providing a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted responsibilities that contributed to this monumental challenge.

Roles and Interactions of Key Stakeholders

Figure 2 Parties involved in the quality control of building construction. source: by the author

Figure 2 illustrates the six key parties involved in the quality control of building construction. Notably, the first and last parties are typically within the purview of the same authority, such as a municipal council, acting as both the makers and enforcers of the building code.

The city’s authority generally comprises a team of building surveyors and engineers entrusted with the responsibility of establishing quality standards and requirements within the building code. This encompasses the formulation of administrative procedures for the application of building consents and certificates of compliance.

Designers, including architects and engineers, undertake the task of creating building designs that align with and satisfy the stipulations of the building code.

Suppliers and builders/contractors play instrumental roles by providing the necessary materials and skilled labor to execute the construction in accordance with the approved design and the requisite workmanship standards.

Internally, builders and clients engage building surveyors and engineers to monitor and enforce quality standards throughout the construction process.

Upon completion of the construction works, the structures are subject to inspection and certification for compliance. External quality controllers, typically authorized by the same authority, often assume the roles of building surveyors and engineers. Their objective is to independently assess the project’s adherence to the building code and overall quality standards, providing the final certification of compliance. This external validation adds an extra layer of assurance and accountability to the construction process.

In the words of Dyer (2019, p12), the building boom of the 1990s fostered a perilous combination: a workforce with inadequate skills and supervision, operating under immense time constraints to construct buildings with new, unfamiliar designs — often incorporating untested and unregulated materials. The repercussions of this toxic mix are staggering to contemplate.

1. Building Code:

The enactment of the 1991 Building Act is widely recognized as a pivotal contributor to the leaky home crisis. Implemented in 1993, this legislation overhauled the building consents system, shifting from a prescriptive model to what can only be described as a self-regulating scheme. Entrusting the responsibility of building consents to the private sector triggered a wave of shortcuts. Consents were issued without adequate documentation, construction inspections were neglected, and compliance certificates were liberally granted, marking a concerning trend.

2. Design Issues

Architects and engineers play a substantial role in shaping a structure’s blueprint. Doubts emerged in the Leaky Homes saga about the adequacy of designs in anticipating water penetration issues.

Certain design features should raise alarms:

  • Flat Roofs without Eaves: Locations prone to water pooling pose inherent problems, particularly with Mediterranean-style roofs in New Zealand’s rainy climate. Roof-to-wall junctions in multi-level or architecturally complex homes pose heightened risks.
  • Insufficient Ground Clearance: Current regulations mandate a 10cm gap between the ground and cladding, but some dwellings lack any gap, exposing them to rain bouncing off the ground and infiltrating cladding. The combination of these design issues, compounded by the shift in building consent responsibility, amplified vulnerabilities during the 1990s building boom, contributing significantly to the leaky homes crisis.

3. The Material Equation:

Material suppliers provide raw elements for construction. Legal battles focused on whether subpar materials or faulty installation were to blame, shedding light on broader accountability in the supply chain.

Following the outbreak of the leaky homes saga, Building Minister Jenny Salesa developed a plan to reform the construction industry. The plan included legal requirements for building products to be “fit for purpose,” detailed product information from manufacturers, and empowered the Ministry of Building Innovation and Employment to investigate products and building methods.

a. Monolithic Cladding: Monolithic cladding, identified by its unbroken finish, poses challenges, especially with flat roofs and insufficient ground clearance. Cracking can lead to water infiltration, resulting in issues ranging from dampness to structural damage.

b. Sub-standard Building Practices & Materials: Homes built before 2004 often had cladding directly fixed to wooden framing without a cavity system, allowing water to become trapped and fostering mold and rot. A legal period (1998–2004) using untreated or lightly-treated wood framing exacerbated these issues.

3. Builders:

Builders, as the artisans bringing architectural visions to life, faced scrutiny during the Leaky Homes crisis. Questions arose about their training and craftsmanship contributing to pervasive leakage issues. Evaluating builders’ responsibilities in ensuring sound construction becomes a critical aspect of this surveying analysis.

BRANZ (2010, p.13) reported that “it has been established that the builder or subtrades have been at fault in some way, including (a) substituting specified materials with others that are inferior and not up to task, often without the approval of the designer and/or the Building Consent Authority, and (b) having insufficient knowledge or understanding of what they were doing, etc”.

Salesa proposed that builders provide homeowners with a guarantee and insurance product covering fault remediation for 10 years, transferable to new owners upon property sale. Builders unable to prove their work’s soundness to insurers would be barred from operating. However, critics, including Peter Dyer, author of “Rottenomics,” raised concerns about addressing the skills base and circumvention of liabilities using multiple entities.

4. Building Controllers: Guardians of Compliance:

Building surveyors and controllers uphold regulatory adherence. The absence of clear regulations regarding cavity walls raises questions about whether building controllers fell short in establishing guidelines to avert the crisis. Examining the regulatory landscape and the effectiveness of building controllers becomes integral to understanding systemic issues.

Under the Building Act 1991, certifying buildings opened to market competition, enabling self-declared private certifiers to compete with local authority inspectors. This approach, as Dyer notes, blurred the lines between regulator and business, expecting them to compete in issuing compliance assessments to the same clients paying for their services, leading to potential conflicts of interest.

As summarized in BRANZ (2010, p.19), Building Consent Authority “BCA liability arises from negligent checking of, or negligent failure to check, the plans and specifications before issuing a building consent, and negligent inspection, or negligent failure to inspect before issuing a Code Compliance Certificate”.

The Collaborative Tapestry:

Rather than assigning blame to a singular entity, the Leaky Homes case highlights the imperative for a collaborative approach to construction. Designers, builders, suppliers, and controllers function as threads in a tapestry, and the robustness of the entire fabric hinges on the seamless cohesion of these elements. The responsibility for the Leaky Homes crisis may indeed be distributed across this collaborative spectrum.

In the aftermath of the Leaky Homes case, affected homeowners advocate for a nuanced exploration of responsibility. The case exposes a prevalent practice of shifting responsibilities to other parties during construction litigations. As we navigate through the aftermath of this crisis, the lessons learned should guide not just punitive measures but also instill a collective commitment to collaboration, transparency, and continuous improvement. This shift in mindset may explain the increasing prevalence of proprietary suppliers specifying designated contractors in contemporary construction practices. Similarly, designers often require nominated or specialist contractors to ensure accountability.

However, discussions surrounding solutions for controllers have been notably scarce. In recent decades, some countries, New Zealand included, have experimented with self-regulatory control. The Leaky Homes saga illuminates certain shortcomings of this approach. Consequently, there is a pressing need for more extensive deliberations on the way forward, charting a course towards a more resilient and accountable future in the realm of building surveying. This entails addressing the complexities of collaborative responsibilities and refining regulatory frameworks to fortify the construction industry against similar crises.

References

Bolton, J. (2022) What you need to know when buying (or selling) a leaky home in New Zealand, Squirrel, 14 January. https://www.squirrel.co.nz/blogs/first-home-buyers/what-to-know-about-leaky-homes

BRANZ (2010) Building Basics — Weathertightness. by Gerg Burn. BRANZ.

Dyers, P. (2012) Rottenomics, the story of New Zealand’s Leaky Buildings Disaster.

Newsroom (2021) The Detail: Leaky or incompetent? The James Hardie case, Newsroom, 26 May. https://newsroom.co.nz/2021/05/26/leaky-or-incompetent-the-james-hardie-case/

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